In this paper, we study the AES block cipher in the chosen-key setting. The adversary's goal of this security model is to find triplets (m, m , k) satisfying some properties more efficiently for the AES scheme than generic attacks. It is a restriction of the classical chosen-key model, since as it has been defined originally, differences in the keys are possible. This model is related to the known-key setting, where the adversary receives a key k, and tries to find a pair of messages (m, m ) that has some property more efficiently than generic attacks. Both models have been called open-key model in the literature and are interesting for the security of AES-based hash functions.
Introduction
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [16] is nowadays the subject of many attention since attacks coming from hash function cryptanalysis have put its security into question. Related-key attacks and meet-in-the-middle attacks that begin in the middle of the cipher (also known as splice-and-cut attacks) have been proposed to attack the full number of rounds for each AES versions [1, 2, 4] , while other techniques exist for smaller version [5] . This interesting connection between hash functions and block ciphers shows that any improvement on hash function cryptanalysis can be useful for attacking block ciphers and vice-versa.
In this work, we study another model that has been suggested to study the security of hash functions based on AES components. Knudsen and Rijmen [9] have proposed to consider known-key attacks since in the hash function domain, the key is usually known and the goal is to find two input messages that satisfy some interesting relations. In some setting, a part of the key can also be chosen (for instance when salt is added to the hash function) and therefore, cryptanalysts have also consider the model where the key is under the control of the adversary. The latter model has been called chosen-key model and both models belong to the open-key model. The chosen-key model has been popularized by Biryukov et al. in [2] , since a distinguisher in this model has been extended to a related-key attack on the full AES-256 version.
Related Work. Knudsen and Rijmen in [9] have been the firsts to consider known-key distinguishers on AES and Feistel schemes. The main motivations for this model are the following:
if there is no distinguisher when the key is known, then there will also be no distinguisher when the key is secret, if it is possible to find an efficient distinguisher, finding partial collision on the output of the cipher more efficiently than birthday paradox would predict even though the key is known, then the authors would not recommend the use of such cipher, finally, such model where the key is known or chosen can be interesting to study the use of cipher in a compression function for a hash function.
In the same work, they present some results on Feistel schemes and on the AES. Following this work, Minier et al. in [14] extend the results on AES on the Rijndael scheme with larger block-size.
In [2] , Biryukov et al. have been the firsts to consider the chosen-key distinguisher for the full 256-bit key AES. They show that in time q · 2 67 , it is possible to construct qmulticollision on Davies-Meyer compression function using AES-256, whereas for an ideal cipher, it would require on average q · 2 q−1 q+1 128 time complexity. In these chosen-key distinguishers, the adversary is allowed to put difference also in the key. Later, Nikolic et al. in [15] , describe known-key and chosen-key distinguishers on Feistel and Substitution-Permutation Networks (SPN). The notion of chosen-key distinguisher is more general than the model that we use: here, we let the adversary choose the key, but it has to be the same for the input and output relations we are looking for. We do not consider related-keys in this article. Then in [12] , rebound attacks have been used to improve known-key distinguishers on AES by Mendel et al. and in [8] , Gilbert and Peyrin have used both the SuperSBox and the rebound techniques to get a known-key distinguisher on 8-round AES-128. Last year at FSE, Sasaki and Yasuda show in [18] an attack on 11 Feistel rounds and collision attacks in hashing mode also using rebound techniques, and more recently, Sasaki et al. studied the known-key scenario for Feistel ciphers like Camellia in [17] .
Our Results. In this paper, we study 128-and 256-bit reduced versions of AES in the (single) chosen-key model where the attacker is challenged to find a key k and a pair of messages (m, m ) such that m ⊕ m ∈ E and AES k (m) ⊕ AES k (m ) ∈ F , where E and F are two known subspaces. On AES-128, we describe in that model a way to distinguish the 7-round AES in time 2 8 and the 8-round AES in time 2 24 . In the case of the 7-round distinguisher, our technique improves the 2 16 time complexity of a regular rebound technique [13] on the SubBytes layer by computing intersections of small lists. The 8-round distinguisher introduces a problem related the SuperSBox construction where the key parameter is under the control of the adversary. As for AES-256, the distinguishers are the natural extensions of the ones on AES-128. Our results are reported in Table 1 . We have experimentally checked our results and examples are provided in the appendices. We believe our practical distinguishers can be useful to construct non-trivial inputs for the AES block cipher to be able to check the validity of some theoretical attacks, for instance [7] .
Outline of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. We begin in Section 2 by recalling the AES and the concept of SuperSBox. Then in Section 3.1, we precise the chosen-key model in the ideal case to be able to compare our distinguishers to the ideal scenario. Section 3.1 describes the main results of the AES-128 and Section 4 shows how to apply similar results to the AES-256. initializes the internal state viewed as a 4 × 4 matrix of bytes as values in the finite field GF (2 8 ), which is defined via the irreducible polynomial
Depending on the version of the AES, N r rounds are applied to that state: N r = 10 for AES-128, N r = 12 for AES-192 and N r = 14 for AES-256. Each of the N r AES round ( Figure 1 After the N r -th rounds has been applied, a final subkey is added to the internal state to produce the ciphertext. The key expansion algorithm to produce the N r + 1 subkeys for AES-128 is described in Figure 2 (a), and in Figure 2 (b) for the AES-256. We refer to the official specification document [16] for further details.
SuperSBox. In [6] , Rijmen and Daemen introduced the concept of SuperSBox to study two rounds of AES. This transformation sees the composition SB • AK(k) • MC • SB as four parallel applications of a 32-bit S-Box, and has been useful for several cryptanalysis works, see for instance [8, 10] . Abusing notations, in the sequel, we call SuperSBox keyed by the key k the transformation that applies this composition to a single AES-column. In that context, the key k which parameterized the SuperSBox is also a 32-bit AES-column. We denote that operation by SuperSBox k .
Notations. In this paper, we count the AES rounds from 0 and we refer to a particular byte of an internal state x by x[i], as depicted in Figure 2 (c). Moreover, as shown in Figure 1 , in the ith round, we denote the internal state after AddRoundKey by x i , after SubBytes by y i , after ShiftRows by z i and after MixColumns by w i . To refer to the difference in a state x, we use the notation ∆x.
3 Chosen-key distinguishers
Limited Birthday Distinguishers
In this section, we precise the distinguishers we are using. Our first goal is to distinguish the AES-128 from an ideal keyed-permutation in the chosen-key model. We will derive distinguishers for AES-256 afterwards. We are interested in the kind of distinguishers where the attacker is asked to find a key and a pair of plaintext whose difference is constrained in a predefined input subspace such that the ciphertext difference lies in an other predefined subspace.
Property 1 Given two subspaces E in and E out , a key k and a pair of messages (x, y) verify the property on a permutation P if x + y ∈ E in and P (x) + P (y) ∈ E out .
This type of distinguisher looks like the limited birthday distinguishers introduced by Gilbert and Peyrin in [8] with a very close lower bound proved in [15] , except that we allow the attacker more freedom; namely, in the choice of the key bits. To determine how hard this problem is, we need to compare the real-world case to the ideal scenario. In the latter, the attacker faces a family 1 of pseudo-random permutations F : K × D −→ D, and would run a limited birthday distinguisher on a particular random permutation F k to find a pair of messages that conforms to the subspace restrictions of Property 1. The additional freedom of this setting does not help the attacker to find the actual pair of messages that verifies the required property, because the permutation F k has to be chosen beforehand. Put it another way, the birthday paradox is as constrained as if the key were known since no difference can be introduced in the key bits.
Therefore, even if we let the key to be chosen by the attacker, the limited birthday distinguisher from [8] applies in the same way. For known E in and E out , we denote n i = dim(E in ) and n o = dim(E out ). In terms of truncated differences, n i (resp. n o ) represents the number of independent active truncated differences in the input (resp. output) of a random permutation F k ∈ F (see Figure 3 ). Both n i and n o range in the interval between 0 and n, where n = 16 in the case of AES. Without loss of generality, we assume that n i ≤ n o : the attacker thus considers F k rather than its inverse, as it is easier to collide on n − n o differences than on n − n i . The attacker continues by constructing two lists L and L of ni n n0
n − n0 F k Figure 3 : Assuming ni ≤ no, the attacker searches for a pair of input to the random permutation F k differing in ni known byte positions such that the output differs in no known byte positions. A gray cell indicates a byte with a truncated difference.
2 8n i plaintexts each by choosing a random value for the n − n i inactive bytes of the input and considering all the n i active ones in E in . With a birthday paradox on the two lists L and L , she expects a collision on at most 2n i bytes of the ciphertexts. In the event that n − n o ≥ 2n i , then n − 2n i bytes have not a zero-difference in the ciphertext. Hence, we need to restart the birthday paradox process about 2 8(n−no−2n i ) times, which costs 2 8(n−no−n i ) in total. Otherwise, if n − n o < 2n i , then a single birthday paradox with lists of size 2 8(n−no)/2 is sufficient to get a collision on the n − n o required bytes in time 2 8(n−no)/2 .
Distinguisher for 7-round AES-128
We consider the 7-round truncated differential characteristic of Figure 4 , where the differences in both the plaintext and the ciphertext lie in subspaces of dimension four. Indeed, the output difference lies in a subspace of dimension four since all the operations after the last SubBytes layer are linear. With respect to the description of the distinguisher (Section 3.1), the time complexity to find a pair of messages that conforms to those patterns in a family of pseudo-random permutations is 2 64 basic operations.
The following of this section describes a way to build a key and a pair of messages that conform to the restrictions in time 2 8 basic operations using a memory complexity of 2 8 bytes. This complexity has to be compared to 2 16 operations, which is the time complexity expected for a straightforward application of the rebound attack [13] on the SubBytes layer of the AES. In that case, there are 16 random differential transitions around the AES S-Box, which happens to be all compatible 2 with probability 2 −16 . Repeating with random differences 2 16 times, we expect to find a pair of internal states that conforms to the randomized differences. In the following, we proceed slightly differently to reach a solution in time 2 8 .
In terms of freedom degrees, we begin by estimating the number of solutions that we expect to verify the truncated differential characteristic. There are 16 bytes in the first message, 4 more independent ones in the second message and 16 others in the key: that makes 36 freedom degrees at the input. On a random input, the probability that the truncated differential characteristic being followed depends on the amount of freedom degrees that we loose in probabilistic transitions within the MixColumns transitions: 3 in round 0 to pass one 4 → 1 truncated transition, 12 in round 3 to pass four 4 → 1 transitions and 3 again in round 4 for the last 4 → 1 transition. In total, we thus expect
triplets (m, m , k) composed by a pair (m, m ) of messages and a key k to conform to the truncated differential characteristic of Figure 4 . Hence, we have 18 freedom degrees left to find such a triplet.
First, we observe that whenever we find such a solution for the middle rounds (round 1 to round 4), we are ensured that all the rounds will be covered as in the whole truncated differential characteristic due to an outward propagation occurring with probability 1. Hence, our strategy focuses on those rounds. The context is similar to the rebound scenario, where we first solve the inbound phase and then propagate it into the outbound phase. To reduce the number of valid solutions, we begin by fixing some bytes ( Figure 5 ) to a random value: ∆z 1 and x 2 [0..3]. Therefore, we can deduce the values and differences in the first column of x 2 and y 2 , as well as the difference ∆x 3 by linearity. Let [∆ 0 , ∆ 1 , ∆ 2 , ∆ 3 ] T be the column-vector of deduced differences in ∆y 2 and diag(δ 0 , δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 ) the differences in the diagonal of ∆x 4 . Linearly, we can express the differences around the SubBytes layer of round 3 (see Figure 6 ). As a consequence, from the differential properties of the AES S-Box, for i, j ∈ {0, . . . , 3}, ∆ j suggests 2 7 different values for δ i : we store them in the list L i,j .
Once done, we build the list L i , for i ∈ {0, . . . , 3}:
Each L i,j being of size 2 7 , we expect each L i to contain 2 4 elements.
We continue by setting ∆x 4 [0] to random value in L 0 and x 4 [0] to a random value, which allow to determine the value and difference in y 4 [0]. Since the difference ∆y 4 can only take 2 8 values due to the MixColumns transition of round 4, we also deduce ∆w 4 and the remaining differences in ∆y 4 . The knowledge of ∆y 4 suggests 2 7 possible values for δ i . As before, we store them in lists called T i , and we select a value for δ i in L i ∩ T i (Figure 7) . We expect each intersection to contain about 2 3 elements. More rigorously, if we assume that the lists L i,j and T i are uniformly distributed, then the probability that L 0 , L 1 ∩ T 1 , L 2 ∩ T 2 and L 3 ∩ T 3 are not empty is higher than 99.96% (see proof in Appendix C). Finally, we compute the values in x 3 and in the diagonal of x 4 . We now need to find a key that matches the previous solving in the internal states: we build a partial pair of internal states that conforms to the middle rounds, but that sets 8 bytes on constraints in the key. Namely, if we denote k i the subkey introduced in round i and u i = MC −1 (k i ), then both u 3 and k 4 have four known bytes (see Figure 8 ). We start by fixing all the bytes marked by 1 in u 3 to random values: this allows to compute the values of all 2's in the two last columns of k 3 . By the column-wise operations of AES key schedule, we can get the values of all bytes marked by 3. As for the 4's, we get them since there are four known bytes among the eight in the first columns of u 3 and k 3 . Again, the key schedule gives the 5's and 6's, and the MixColumns the 7's. Finally, we determine values for all the byte tagged by 8 from the key schedule equations. By inverting the key schedule, we are thus able to compute the master key k.
All in all, we start by getting a partial pair of internal states that conforms to the middle rounds, continue by deriving a valid key that matches the partial known bytes and determine the rest of the middle internal states to get the pair on input messages. The bottleneck of the time and memory complexity occurs when handling the lists of size at most 2 8 elements to compute intersections. Note that those intersections can be done in roughly 2 8 operations by representing lists by 256-bit numbers and then perform a logical AND.
In the end, we build a pair of messages (m, m ) and a key k that conforms to the truncated differential characteristic of Figure 4 in time 2 8 basic operations, where it costs 2 64 in the generic scenario. We note that among the 18 freedom degrees left for the attack, we used only 10 by setting 10 bytes to random values, such that we expect 2 8×8 = 2 64 solutions in total. All those solutions could be generated in time 2 64 by iterating over all the possibilities of the bytes marked by 1 in Figure 8 .
We implemented the described algorithm to verify that it indeed works, and we found for instance the triplet (m, m , k) reported in Appendix A.
Distinguisher for 8-round AES-128
We consider the 8-round truncated differential characteristic of Figure 9 , where the matrices of differences in both the plaintext and the ciphertext lie in the same matrix subspaces of dimension four as before. Indeed, the output difference lies in a subspace of dimension four since all the operations after the last SubBytes layer are linear. Again, the distinguisher previously described (Section 3.1) claims that the time complexity to find a pair of messages that conforms to those patterns in a family of pseudo-random permutations runs in time 2 64 operations. The following of this section describes a way to build a key and a pair of messages that conform to the restrictions in time and memory complexity 2 24 . We note that it is possible to optimize the memory requirement to 2 16 . As in the previous section, there are 36 freedom degrees at the input, which shrink to 18 after the consideration of the truncated differential characteristic. Therefore, we also expect 2 8×18 solutions in the end.
First of all, we observe that finding 2 24 triplets (m, m , k) composed by a key and a pair of internal states that conform to the rounds 2 to 5 is sufficient since the propagation in the outward rounds is done with probability 2 −24 due to the MixColumns transition of round 1. The following analysis consequently focuses of those four middle rounds.
We now describe an instance of a problem that we use as a building block in our algorithm, which is related to the keyed SuperSBox construction. Problem 1. Let a and b two bytes. Given a 32-bit input and output differences ∆ in and ∆ out of a SuperSBox k for a unknown k, find all the pairs of AES-columns (c, c ) and keys k such that:
Considering the key k known and the case where there is no restriction on the output bytes (iii), we would expect this problem to have one solution on average. Finding it would naively require 2 32 computations by iterating over the 2 32 possible inputs and check whether the output has the correct ∆ out known difference. The additional constraints on the two output bytes reduce the success of finding a pair (c, c ) of input to 2 −16 , but if we allow the four bytes in the key k to be chosen, then we expect 2 16 solutions to this problem.
To find all of them in 2 16 simple operations, we proceed as follows ( Figure 10 ): the two output bytes a and b being known, we can deduce the values of the two associated bytes before the last SubBytes,ã andb respectively. We can also deduce the difference in those bytes since the output difference is known. Then, we guess the two unset differences at the input of the last SubBytes: the differences then propagate completely inside the SuperSBox. At both SubBytes layers, by the differential properties of the AES S-Box, we expect to find one value on average for each of the six unset transitions. Consequently, the input and output of the AddRoundKey operation are known, which determines the four bytes of k. In the end, we find the 2 16 solutions of Problem 1 in time 2 16 operations. To apply this strategy to the 8-round truncated differential characteristic of Figure 9 , we start by randomizing the difference ∆y 2 , the difference ∆w 5 and the values in the first column of w 5 . Due to the linear operations involved, we deduce ∆x 3 = ∆w 2 from ∆y 2 and ∆y 4 from ∆w 4 . To use the previous algorithm, we randomize the values of the two first columns of w 4 (situtation in Figure 11 ). Doing so, the four columns of y 4 are constrained on two bytes each and have fixed differences. Consequently, the four SuperSBoxes between x 3 and y 4 keyed by the four corresponding columns of k 4 conforms to the requirements 3 of Problem 1. In time and memory complexity 2 16 , for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, we store the 2 16 solutions for the ith SuperSBox associated to the ith column of x 4 in the list L i .
We continue by observing that the randomization of the bytes in w 4 actually sets the value of two diagonal bytes in k 5 , k 5 [0] and k 5 [5] , which imposes constraints of the elements in the lists L i . We start by considering the 2 16 elements of L 3 , and for each of them, we . At this point, we constructed 2 16+8 = 2 24 solutions in time 2 24 that we store in a list L 0,3 . As k 5 [5] has been previously determined, we can deduce k 4 [5] = k 5 [5] + k 5 [1] from the AES key schedule for each of the entry of L 0,3 . Again, this adds an 8-bit constraint on the elements of L 1 : we expect 2 8 of them to match the condition on k 4 [5] . In total, we could construct a list L 0,1,3 of size 2 24+8 = 2 32 , whose elements would be the columns 0, 1 and 3 of x 4 and k 4 , but as soon as we get 2 24 elements in that list, we stop and discard the remaining possibilities.
Finally, to ensure the correctness of the choice in the remaining column 2, we need to consider the MixColumns operation in round 4 and the subkey k 5 . Indeed, as soon as we choose an element in both L 0,1,3 and L 2 , x 4 , k 4 and k 5 become fully determined, but we need to ensure that the values x 5 [10] and x 5 [15] equal to the known ones. In particular, for x 5 [10], we have: 
and for x 5 [15] : 
where (3), (6) and (7) come from the key schedule, (4) and (8) 
and lookup in L 2 to find 2 16 2 −8×2 = 1 element that match those two byte conditions. We create the list L by adding the found element from L 2 to each entry of L 0,1,3 .
All in all, in time and memory complexity 2 24 , we build L of size 2 24 and we now exhaust its elements to find one that passes the 2 −24 probability of the 4 → 1 backward transition in the MixColumns of round 1. Indeed, an a → b transition in the MixColumns layer cancels 4 − b output bytes, so that it would happen with probability 2 −8(4−b) for a random input a. Consequently, we expect to find a pair (m, m ) of messages and a key k that conforms to the 8-round truncated differential characteristic of Figure 9 in time 2 24 when it requires 2 64 computations in the ideal case.
Among the 18 available freedom degrees available to mount the attack, we uses 17 of them, which means that we expect to have 2 8 solutions. We could have them in time 2 32 , but since we discarded 2 8 elements in the algorithm described, we get only 1 in time 2 24 . We note that it is possible to gain a factor 2 8 in the memory requirements of our attack since we can implement the algorithm without storing the lists L 0 , L 0,3 and L 0,1,3 , by using hash tables for L 1 , L 2 and L 3 . We also implemented the described algorithm to verify that it indeed works, and we found for instance the triplet (m, m , k) reported in Appendix B.
Extention to AES-256
The two distinguishers described in the previous section can be easily extended in distinguishers on the AES-256. The main idea is to use the 16 additional freedom degrees in the key to extend the truncated differential characteristics by introducing a new fully active round in the middle.
Distinguisher for 7-round AES-256
The first step of the attack described in the 7-round distinguisher on AES-128 (Section 3.2) still applies in the case of AES-256 since it does not involve the key schedule. Then, we can generate a compatible key easily since there are only two subkeys involved: we can just choose bytes of k 3 and k 4 as we want, except the imposed ones, and deduce the master key afterwards. This yields to a distinguisher with time and memory complexities around 2 8 .
Distinguisher for 8-round AES-256
We use a similar approach as the 7-round distinguisher on AES-128 of Section 3.2, but the truncated differential characteristic has one more fully active round in the middle 4 .
We begin by choosing values for ∆z 1 and x 2 [0..3]. This allows to deduce ∆x 2 , ∆y 2 , and ∆x 3 . Then, we also set random values for ∆w 5 and for the diagonal of x 5 to obtain both ∆x 5 and ∆y 4 . Now, we find a value for ∆x 4 , which is compatible with ∆x 3 and ∆y 4 . Indeed, we can not take an arbitrary value for ∆x 4 because the probability that it fits is very close to 2 −32 . However, we can find a correct value with the following steps:
1. Store the 2 7 possible values for ∆x 4 [0] in a list L 0 . 2. In a similar way, make lists L 1 with ∆x 4 [1] , L 2 with ∆x 4 [2] and L 3 with ∆x 4 [3] . On average, we go back to the step 3 only 2 8−7 4 = 2 4 times since lists are of size 2 7 . In the same way, we can obtain values for the other columns of x 4 .
At this point, we computed actual values in all those internal states, and we need to generate a compatible key. Finding one can be done using the procedure described in Figure Figure 12 . Bytes tagged by 1 are chosen at random, odd steps use the key schedule equations and even steps the properties of MixColumns. 
Distinguisher for 9-round AES-256
We begin as in Section 3.3 by choosing the difference ∆y 2 , the difference ∆w 6 and the values in the first column of w 6 . Then, we deduce ∆w 2 = ∆x 3 from ∆y 2 and ∆y 5 from ∆w 5 . In addition, we set x 3 to a random value, which allows to determine ∆x 4 . In order to apply the result from Problem 1 again, we set the values in two first columns of w 5 to random values.
As before, for i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}, we store in the list L i the 2 16 possible values of the i-th column of x 5 and the i-th column of k 5 . Unlike previously, we also obtain values of the i-th column of SR(k 4 ), but the scenario of the attack still applies. We start by observing that bytes of L 0 allow to compute k 4 [1] and k 4 [13] , which are bytes of L 3 . Thus, we can merge L 0 and L 3 in a list L 0,3 containing 2 16 elements. Then, we construct the list L 0,2,3 containing 2 24 elements of L 0,3 × L 2 . Finally, from bytes of L 0,2,3 , we can compute: 
As a consequence, we expect only one element of L 1 to satisfy those two byte conditions and so, we obtain 2 24 solutions for the middle rounds. All in all, this yields to a distinguisher with a time complexity around 2 24 and a memory requirement around 2 16 using the same trick given in Section 3.3.
Conclusion
In this paper, we study the Advanced Encryption Standard and show how to find a pair of messages and a key that satisfy some property a lot more efficiently than a generic attack based on the birthday paradox for both AES-128 and AES-256. Our new results improve A Solution for the 7-round truncated differential characteristic on AES-128 B Solution for the 8-round truncated differential characteristic on AES-128 Table 3 : Example of a pair of messages (m, m ) that conforms to the 8-round truncated differential characteristic for AES-128 of Section 3.3. The master key found by the attack is: 98C45623 6CA00686 301E836D 614DFAB0. The lines in this array contains the values of two internal states before entering the corresponding round, as well as their difference.
Round m m m ⊕ m Init. 9588B342 D43D04D4 AB298AE1 E43687DB 0B88B342 D46904D4 AB29D0E1 E4368728 9E000000 00540000 00005A00 000000F3 0 0D4CE561 B89D0252 9B37098C 857B7D6B 934CE561 B8C90252 9B37538C 857B7D98 9E000000 00540000 00005A00 000000F3 End 16E58308 DFD78F11 A8B05B9D C0A0363E E49CFA83 D4DC9207 FC4CF3C9 9B3BF6FE F279798B 0B0B1D16 54FCA854 5B9BC0C0
C Probability of success
We are interested in the probability that the intersection of four or five subsets of {1, . . . , 255} each of size 128 being empty.
To evaluate it, let P denote the set of subsets X ⊂ {1, . . . , 255} such that |X| = 128. We also define:
T (n, k) := {(X 1 , . . . , X n ) ∈ P n | |X 1 ∩ . . . ∩ X n | = k} for n ≥ 1, k ≥ 0.
In others words, |T (n, k)|/|P n | is the probability that the intersection of n elements from P has a size equal to k.
Property 2
The cardinality of T (n, k) satisfies the following recurrence relation:
|T (1, k)| = |P| if k = 128, 0 otherwise |T (n + 1, k)| = 128 l=k |T (n, l)| l k 255−l 128−k for n ≥ 1, k ≥ 0.
Proof. First, we note that we can partition P n by the sets:
T (n, Y ) := {(X 1 , . . . , X n ) ∈ P n | X 1 ∩ . . . ∩ X n = Y } for any subset Y ⊂ {1, . . . , 255}.
Then, we have: Using Maple, we found that the probability of failure of the distinguisher described in Section 3.2 is:
T (4, 0) |P| 4 × T (5, 0) |P| 5
